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 In two declamations composed to support his student protégés at Deuterius' 
school of grammar and rhetoric at Milan, the Milanese deacon Ennodius (later bishop of 
Pavia) praised their master as the sustainer of ruitura libertas, of a liberty on the point of 
collapse.1 What did he mean by this? 
 First, let us look at the historical context. With due allowance for Ennodian 
hyperbole, Deuterius seems to have been partly responsible for a revival of rhetorical 
education in northern Italy following the devastation of the wars of 489-93 between 
Odoacer and Theoderic the Great. In another declamation, Ennodius saluted his 
achievement in transferring his school to the forum of Milan: From the lairs of wild 
beasts and the habitations of owls, you recall us to the fora, from which our forebears had 
long been all but absent.2 In this, Deuterius was probably encouraged by the Ostrogothic 
regime of Theoderic. It was presumably Theoderic who bestowed on him the rank of 
spectabilis, an unusual honour for a grammarian.3 One of Ennodius' poems hailed 
Deuterius as imperii custos, "guardian of the realm".4 His title paralleled the 
encouragement given by the Ostrogoths to higher education in Rome,5 and the rhetorical 
establishments of the two cities fostered ties between them. Paterius, son of a senator, 
was his godson, as well as his pupil.6 Ennodius' correspondence suggests that a number 
of young gentry from the north trod a path from the school of Deuterius to those of 
Rome, assisted by Ennodius' commendations to leading  
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Roman senators and churchmen.7 Three at least of his protégés were among the north 
Italians who dominate the prosopography of Ostrogothic Italy for Romans in high office. 
(We should not, however, exaggerate the role of professional teachers: both the Variae, 
and Ennodius' writings, suggest that leading senators and churchmen often shared in the 
liberal education of the gentry, supplementing - as did Ennodius - and perhaps sometimes 
replacing the work of the professional.8) 
 To look, now, at libertas: this is a commonplace in the texts of the time; 
something championed for the Romans by Theoderic and his successors, decried from his 
prison-cell by Boethius as fictitious, recovered for Italy and Africa by Justinian, defended 
by Pope Vigilius during the tumult of the Gothic wars, and even by the emperor Phocas 
in 608.9 Why, though, did it figure in Ennodius' praise of a Milanese school-master? If 
the Romans themselves ever had any concept close to what we now term 
"Romanisation," it was the ideal of bestowing civilisation, humanitas, by the equitable 
administration of regular laws.10 Humanitas and leges went together for Cicero , as did 
humanitas and doctrina11. For the ill-fated Varus, trying to turn the Germans into 
obedient subjects, a prime objective was to persuade them to settle disputes in court, not 
by the sword.12 And, over five centuries later, when Justinian wished to persuade the 
Caucasian Lazi of the benefits of Roman rule, he staged a full-scale formal trial of two 
Roman officers for the murder of the Lazic king: a court worthy of the traditions of 
Imperial Rome and Democratic Athens was set up at the foot of the Caucasus13. By the 
sixth century, though, humanitas seems to be replaced in the Latin texts by the concepts 
of civilitas and libertas, which Cassiodorus and  
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Ennodius shared. “To guard the laws is a sign of civilitas”.14 Cranes, in their social 
harmony, are free by their voluntary servitude.15 Libertas, of which law is the 
champion,16 is incompatible both with the turmoils of war, and with the unjust and 
arbitrary rule associated with tyrannical emperors and barbarian kings. By rescuing Gaul 
from the Franks, Theoderic recalled the provincials to their ancient libertas identical with 
the rule of law.17 In the values of Pope Gregory the Great, libertas is something enjoyed 
only by the free subjects of Roman emperors, not the servile subjects of barbarians.18 It is 
this ideal that lies at the heart of Priscus' famous dispute with the renegade at the court of 
Attila on the rival merits of the Roman and barbarian way of life.19 And Gregory's 
formulation is foreshadowed by Cassiodorus in a significant context. In Variae, IX.21, 
defending from embezzlement the salaries of the teachers of grammar, rhetoric and law at 
Rome, he praises grammar and rhetoric as the unique possession of the lawful rulers of 
Romans, alien to barbarian kings. Thence the battle of the orators sounds the war-call of 
civil law; thence noble eloquence recommends all leading men; and thence, to say no 
more, our present words derive. Ennodius, declaiming on the dedication of Deuterius' 
auditorium in the forum, has a similar ring: “To you, [Deuterius] therefore are owed these 
benefits, that the advocate about to cite the defendant will begin his speech as an object 
of fear in the halls that he has already experienced. To you, sole hope of a distinguished 
profession, is it owed that nobility will shortly give pleasure by a free man's toil.”20 
 But how vital is the link between rhetoric and law? In his study of Roman 
advocacy, John Crook argues that while, under the empire, courts became ever more 
inquisitorial, and the law ever more technical, the clash of trained pleaders remained 
highly important to the upholding of equity, even among the disputes of Egyptian 
peasants. 
 Advocacy, he claims, was "the point of input into the law of values from outside, 
the perceptions of the community at large... the one unguarded gate in the wall of the 
`autonomous science of law'.... The advocate belonged to a culture... in which the word... 
was the most highly developed tool of communication, and persuasion by means of the 
word the most fully worked-out technology. Advocacy was also the product of an 
essentially non-totalitarian (free, if you like) approach to conflicts; for it implied a world 
in which it was worth arguing, in which conclusions were not foregone and you might, by 
the application of  
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skill, win against the odds."21 Similarly, Montesquieu remarked on Turkish autocracy, "to 
have the passions of pleaders would be quite dangerous there; these passions presuppose 
an ardent desire to see justice done, a hatred, an active spirit, and a steadfastness in 
pursuit of justice."22 
 A perception of this may underlie the Ennodian link between rhetoric, law, and 
libertas. (As it may also underlie Agathias' stress on the forensic oratory at the trial 
among the Lazi.) Ennodius equated the right arms of rhetors with freedom of speech 
(libertas linguarum).23 In controversiae composed for Deuterius' school, he addressed the 
imaginary judges as praesules libertatis.24 In the Panegyric on Theoderic, he complained 
(tendentiously, of course) that, through the neglect of learning and eloquence under 
Odoacer, the most eloquent became grimy among his ploughs, and violence refused what 
education had bestowed. The tribunals mourned in the silence of the advocate, and no 
triumph was conferred on the orator. When talent was not dedicated to letters, the 
outcome of lawsuits was doubtful.25 Cassiodorus wrote to those Gauls who had come 
under the rule of Theoderic, recalled to former libertas, clothe yourselves in the mores of 
the toga... receive, little by little, the mores of the judge - and the phrase moribus togatis 
plays on the synonym togatus for an advocate.26 Again, in the Variae, a man falsely 
convicted is pardoned, because he was denied an advocate at his trial: “You also add 
what justice wholly forbids: that you were deprived of the frequently requested advocacy 
of legal defenders, although your opponents, distinguished for their talents, were able to 
tie you in the nooses of the law, despite your innocence.”27 Boethius lamented that no 
residue of Roman liberty could be hoped for; this should be set in the context not only of 
his struggles for others against official injustice, but of his condemnation in absentia by 
the Senate, “silent and undefended.”28 
 Rhetoric, however, was not the only means by which there could be "an input into 
the law of values from outside". After the sixth century, so far as I am aware,  
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there is little sign in western laws of a role for the rhetorical advocate, despite the 
construction of codes on the Roman model.29 Only, and unsurprisingly, in Visigothic 
Spain do the law-codes (likewise the writings of Isidore of Seville) envisage the 
causidicus at work.30 The advocate's mingled appeals to reason and emotion depended on 
a relatively peaceful and cultured society: they were sustained by, as well as sustaining, 
libertas. The harshness of undiluted legal inquisition is mitigated, instead, by non-rational 
conflict, by oaths of purgation and compurgation, by miracles, ordeals and single-combat. 
As Walter Pohl has recently remarked, "in the middle of the seventh century... the power 
of words was on the decline, and the power of the Word had taken its role as a 
counterpart" [he probably means counterweight] "to worldly violence. Western writers 
resorted less to classicizing speeches and more to miracles when individuals were to 
escape imprisonment and imminent danger."31 Not, perhaps, until Alcuin's Disputatio de 
Rhetorica et Virtutibus are there possible signs of a revival of forensic rhetoric.32 
 This insight may also be applicable to the period of Deuterius, to Ennodius' view 
of a libertas rescued by him from imminent destruction. How much of a place was there 
for the advocate in his Italy? In 442, Valentinian III issued an edict on the Italian bar 
which envisaged its normal functioning. In 451, however, he changed his mind: it is well 
known that after the fatal destruction of the enemy [probably Alaric], from which Italy 
suffered, in certain regions both advocates and judges were lacking, and today men 
learned in the law and the statutes are found either rarely or not at all. For this necessity 
has caused perpetual tenure to be given to provincial advocates.33 As for Gaul, the Gallic 
interpretatio to the same edict omits the part quoted “because these provinces do not use 
it”, 
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 implying, perhaps, that there the official framework of the legal profession had largely 
disintegrated. If so, this is one aspect of the change by which, as Peter Heather has put it, 
"The disappearance of bureaucratic careers thus pulled the rug" from under classical 
culture34. The events and conditions of the second half of the fifth century can only have 
made matters worse, even in Italy. The functions of the defensor civitatis, once an 
eligible post for barristers, seem (to judge by his appointment formula in the Variae) to 
have dwindled to control of the urban market.35 
 However, even after the ravaging of Italy in the Gothic wars, Cassiodorus, in his 
Institutiones, repeatedly noted the utility of rhetoric in law-suits.36 Before those wars, 
under the long peace of the Ostrogothic kings, provincial barristers are attested at Spoleto 
and Milan,37 the bar of Rome still flourished, and advocacy remained a high-road to 
official posts and senatorial membership. A much greater range of opportunities for civil 
careers survived in Italy than in the other western kingdoms. As Ennodius wrote to a 
friend, [Liguria] nourishes in the forum seeds that even the Senate may gladly cherish. 
The pleader and the senator are well known to be closely linked.38 The phrase atria 
libertatis was applied by him to the auditorium of Deuterius, and by official discourse to 
the Senate.39 Although some cities were controlled by Gothic counts, Roman cognitores 
still heard their lawsuits between Romans, and the politics of one of them, Naples, were 
dominated by its rhetoricians.40 Even the Gothic patrician Tuluin, as chief minister of 
Athalaric, had the former leading advocate Arator, once a pupil of Deuterius and prot‚g‚ 
of Ennodius, assigned to him as his chief counsellor.41 There are signs in Ennodius' own 
writings that he may have pleaded in court with the duties (though probably not the title) 
of defensor ecclesiae while deacon of Milan.42 The culture of legal libertas guaranteed 
(in theory) by eloquence was not yet dead.  
 It was, however, recurrently endangered. Hence, Cassiodorus wrote in a 
diplomatic letter to Justinian's magister officiorum, at an early stage of the Gothic wars, 
“thought must be given to liberty, which is everywhere shaken by the tumults of war.”43 
It was, indeed, slowly undermined by war and politics. From 
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 the mid fifth century onwards, and continuing under Byzantine rule, society was 
dominated less by the civilian magnate than by what Sidonius called the privilege of the 
military class”44 - and, in Ennodius' day, that meant Gothic tribesmen and Gothic 
magnates like Tuluin. Even such senators as Liberius and Cassiodorus held military 
commands, and a noble of the Decii trained his sons equally in letters and the use of 
weapons.45 Romans now had to compete with their masters in their masters' skills. Was 
prestige shifting from the civil to the military arts? 46  
 However, there were still important and non-forensic roles for oratory. It was 
demanded by diplomacy, whether between Churches, between communities and rulers, or 
between rulers themselves, and was practised equally by churchmen and laymen. 
Ennodius' protégé Arator brought himself to Theoderic's notice and high official honour 
by his eloquent heading of an embassy from the province of Dalmatia to the king.47 And 
Ennodius' Life of Epiphanius both stressed the bishop of Pavia's role as diplomat, and 
presented his persuasion of a sequence of monarchs virtually in the form of rhetorical 
controversiae, reminiscent of Ennodian productions for the school of Deuterius. I have 
especially in mind the declamation (responding to one by Arator) where Ennodius argued 
that the laws of war should be applied, and the priests and Vestals of a captured city 
retained in slavery.48 If for Vestals we substitute nuns, we have here a theme of real 
relevance to the conditions of the age.49 And Ennodius' defence of the rights of 
conquerors is thematically (though not verbally) paralleled by the speech he gives to king 
Gundobad of Burgundy, opposing Epiphanius' plea for the release of Ligurian farmers 
enslaved in war. King Euric is made to respond (via an interpreter) to the eloquence of 
Epiphanius: “They are in error who say that the Romans do not have shields or javelins 
on their tongues. For they know both how to ward off the words that we direct against 
them, and how to reach the inmost heart with those that they aim.”50 
 There were, of course, further uses for oratory: prose panegyrics on rulers and 
high officials, and the Cassiodorian mingling of rhetoric with chancellery directives in 
the Variae. Ennodius' own corpus displays a range of uses for elaborate rhetoric in 
Church service: his pamphlet in support of Pope Symmachus, his directive (probably 
drafted for Archbishop Laurentius of Milan) to bishops to  
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take cellulani, declamations for church dedications, for the blessing of Paschal candles, 
for episcopal anniversaries.51 
 However, I suspect that the vitality of this rhetorical tradition depended largely on 
its forensic element: it was based on the vast demand still produced by Roman litigants. 
The leading official Opilio, out of office and enjoying his provinciale otium, was 
besieged by litigants begging him to act as a iudex privatus.52 It is significant that Arator 
had made his reputation as a barrister, a patronus in private lawsuits, before he was called 
to act as patronus of Dalmatia (a province not his own) in its embassy to Theoderic.53 So 
too, when Arator praises the diplomatic eloquence of the Gallic noble Parthenius before 
Theoderic in aid of peace and libertas, he treats his speech as legal pleading: That king, 
in whose judgement that case then lay, as an admiring hearer, could refuse nothing.54 
 To return to the theme of rhetoric and libertas in the values of Ennodius and 
Cassiodorus, rhetorical training is not only associated with freedom as the guarantor of 
legal justice, but as the guarantor of high social status, of nobilitas - in fact, nobilitas and 
libertas overlap. The liberal studies are a threshold of nobility; Partenius, my nephew, 
wishes to appear a free man through the disciplines of liberal studies.55 In Ennodius' 
Deuterian compositions, nobility, revived or confirmed by rhetoric, is a theme so 
recurrent as to be obsessive - an indication, perhaps, of a feeling that the ideal was in 
peril. To you alone [Deuterius] is it granted to confer or restore ancestral honour... birth 
gives liberty, the teacher makes a man worthy of liberty... uneducated nobility refuses the 
gift of Heaven.56 As for Sidonius, so for Ennodius, the indicium nobilitatis still lay in 
rhetorical education; but, in Theoderic's Italy, unlike Euric's Gaul, the gradus dignitatum 
had not yet been lost. Those pupils whom you [Deuterius] see displaying their future light 
by a few sparks, are setting forth for the constellations of the Roman Senate.57 
 For Ennodius, freedom and liberal education were the perquisites and signs of 
ancient families. Cassiodorus, writing in a broader social and political context, had a 
rather different perspective. Another Ennodian protégé, Fidelis, was of noble birth by 
Ligurian standards; to the Senate, however, he was a novus homo, to be commended by 
rhetorical and forensic talent, which was his family inheritance, but which was a 
producer, not a product of nobility. “For, if ancient  
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     riches, passed through the family, make noblemen, he is far more distinguished whose 
ancestry is found to be wealthy in the treasures of wisdom.”58 Fidelis was eventually 
killed outside Pavia in the Gothic Wars, while holding office as perhaps the penultimate 
Italian Praetorian Prefect of Italy.59 Neither ancestral wealth, nor ancestral learning, were, 
in the long run, guarantors of liberty in this increasingly warlike society. The Lombards, 
swearing oaths in court per arma sacrata, on consecrated weapons, seem symbolic.60 
 Ennodius, though, may have looked forward beyond the death of freedom and 
nobility. Both in general and in detail, his corpus sometimes seems to me to foreshadow 
Cassiodorus' treatment of rhetoric in the Expositio Psalmorum: something that he is 
publicly adapting to Christian discourse for educational ends.61 His protégés, studying 
grammar and rhetoric at Rome, are urged, in the Paraenesis Didascalica, to cultivate the 
Christian, as well as the secular virtues.62 (Compare Cassiodorus' praise of Fidelis' 
chastity.63) The speeches in the Life of Epiphanius show how rhetoric could be deployed 
by a Christian, rather in the way that the hardships of Epiphanius' diplomatic journeys 
transpose the labours of the secular envoy into the mode of Christian asceticism, even of 
martyrdom. And, when Gregory the Great formulated the old Roman ideal of libertas, he 
did so not as an advocate in court, but as a pastor, blending it with Christian values to 
defend the libertas of a governor, who had been flogged for embezzlement in violation of 
his free and high-ranking Roman status.64 
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